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Introduction
Luxembourg took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1
July 2015 in a climate of internal and external crisis. The budgetary situation in Greece
had worsened to the point where Greece’s ability to remain in the eurozone (and the
EU) was at stake. At the same time, a bank-run forced Greece’s banks to temporarily
close. Moreover, the refugee crisis reached a climax in 2015 and tensions between EU
Member States about the handling of the situation and the distribution of refugees made
a common approach difﬁcult even in the face of humanitarian disaster. Furthermore, the
Ukraine crisis simmered on. In addition, a terrorist attack in Paris brought internal security
issues to the fore. Finally, following British Prime Minister David Cameron’s promise of
a referendum on whether Britain should remain in the European Union, the EU had to
start a phase of renegotiation of certain policies and processes to allow Cameron to avoid
Brexit.
The organization of this EU presidency fell to one of the smallest – but most
experienced – Member States of the European Union. It was Luxembourg’s 12th
rotating presidency, which meant that many ofﬁcials and some ministers had experienced
at least one if not more previous presidencies. In addition, the institutional context of this
presidency had also changed quite dramatically since the 11th Luxembourgish presidency
in 2005 thanks to the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the trio presidencies.
If one adopts Vandecasteele and Bossuyt’s (2014) criteria for the performance of
presidencies, the prospects for Luxembourg were mixed. In their review of the literature
on the presidencies of the Council of the European Union, Vandecasteele and Bossuyt
(2014, p. 241) identify conditions for presidency performance that fall into three catego-
ries: external context, national conditions and issue-speciﬁc characteristics. A favourable
environment is seen as facilitating success, but external crises can also offer opportunities
for leadership. By contrast Kietz (2007) underlines the extent to which external crises and
highly sensitive dossiers challenge the ability of presidencies to reach compromise. In
terms of national conditions, three appear key: good preparation, Brussels-based presi-
dencies where the Permanent Representation has some leeway in the negotiations and a
good reputation (which includes expertise and experience). Being a small state like
Luxembourg can be advantageous, if it goes hand-in-hand with better communication
within the ministries and a willingness to act as an honest broker, rather than defender
of national interests (Vandecasteele and Bossuyt, 2004, pp. 241–242). But, as evidenced
by Warntjen’s (2007) analysis of the impact of presidencies on environmental
JCMS 2016 pp. 1–10 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12410
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
policy-making, neither small nor large states can be said to have a systematic advantage.
Quaglia and Moxon-Browne (2006) also emphasize the importance of ‘intangible’ factors
like expertise, credibility and a pro-European attitude of the government holding the pres-
idency based on their comparison of the Irish and Italian presidencies of 2003 and 2004.
The effect of issue-speciﬁc characteristics is more disputed, but it seems that qualiﬁed
majority voting (QMV) makes it easier for the presidency to succeed in reaching an agree-
ment and to shape that agreement (Tallberg, 2004; Warntjen, 2007). Also, diverse interests
among actors may make it easier for the presidency to shape a compromise that reﬂects
(some of) its own interests, but only if the disagreements are not too strong. Intense
disagreements lower the chances of success (Vandecasteele and Bossuyt, 2014, p. 243).
In the light of these arguments, this contribution analyses how the difﬁcult external
context of the Luxembourgish presidency affected it in the context of the Lisbon Treaty,
and to what extent the presidency could create the conditions for success. For this
purpose, it will ﬁrst review the context, resources and style of the presidency, before
reviewing its priorities and achievements.1
I. Managing the Presidency in a Changed Context
The Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 introduced three important changes from the point of view of
the rotating presidency. It created a new permanent president of the European Council, the
High Representative – supported by the European External Action Service – became the
chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and the Trio Presidency was modiﬁed. The ﬁrst two
changes in some way facilitated the work of the rotating presidency, as it reduced its
workload and thus the resource requirements of presidencies.2
Luxembourg adapted quite well to the changed circumstances. It accepted that the big
priorities are now set by the European Council and the Commission and that the Council of
the European Union has become the legislative arm of the European Council. There was no
competition between the permanent President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and
the Luxembourgish presidency of the Council of the European Union.3 In the same way,
Luxembourg accepted that the presidency had lost inﬂuence over the EU’s foreign policy.
Instead of trying to develop priorities in this area – as some of the preceding presidencies
had done – it mainly focused on supporting the High Representative.4
The emergence of key European posts reduced the pressure on the presidency in some
areas. European Council President, Donald Tusk, for example, played a particularly
important role in the negotiations with the United Kingdom on the reform of the EU as
these negotiations fell clearly under the competence of the Heads of State or Government.
Tusk insisted that David Cameron present his demands in written form and Cameron duly
obliged (Cameron, 2015). In the same vein, the Greek crisis affected the presidency less
than one might expect. Most of the emergency meetings were organized at the Eurogroup
1 In addition to an analysis of relevant documents and news coverage, this contribution is based on interviews with an of-
ﬁcial of the Council of the European Union and seven ofﬁcials from different Luxembourgish ministries and the Permanent
Representation of Luxembourg.
2 Interview with a member of the Luxembourgish Permanent Representation in Brussels, 24 February 2016.
3 Interview with a Council ofﬁcial for Transport, Telecommunications, Energy, Brussels, 15 February 2016.
4 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 25 February 2016.
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level and were thus chaired by the Eurogroup President, Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Some
meetings took place at the level of Heads of State or Government and were thus chaired
by Donald Tusk and only a few took place in the form of the Ecoﬁn Council under
Luxembourgish leadership. The presidency was mostly affected by certain issues spilling
over into other dossiers (for example, budget negotiations) and by the general increase in
workload for European ﬁnance ministries.5
However, other crises affected the presidency. Both the refugee crisis and debates
about security in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris required the organization
of a number of informal or extraordinary councils by the presidency.
In comparison, the modiﬁcation of the Trio of rotating presidencies had little effect on
the actual functioning of the rotating presidencies. Whereas formerly each presidency was
supposed to cooperate with the preceding and the following presidency, the Trio now
consists of a team of three countries that are supposed to coordinate their three presiden-
cies over an 18-month period. In reality, interviewees felt that the Trio had little impact on
the Luxembourgish presidency (and presidencies in general) (see also Warntjen, 2013).
While ofﬁcials appreciated the importance of drawing up a collective strategy, the
strategy of the Trio was regarded as the least important inﬂuence on the priorities of
the Luxembourgish presidency.6 Changes in the composition of the European
Commission and the European Parliament meant that political preferences had shifted
and the Trio strategy was no longer up-to-date.
In practice, the Luxembourgish presidency – which was the last in the Trio with Italy
and Latvia7 – mainly cooperated with the preceding and following presidencies. In fact,
cooperation with both Latvia and the Netherlands was very good. In the negotiations on
the Juncker Plan, for example, Latvia allowed the Luxembourgish team to attend all
trialogues with the European Parliament and the Commission as it was clear that this
would spill over to the Luxembourgish presidency.8 On the railway package, the
Luxembourgers and the Dutch worked together almost like a double presidency, as it
was clear that the negotiations would continue during the Dutch presidency.9 The smooth
transition between the Luxembourg and Dutch trios was helped by extensive experience
of cooperation, for example, as part of the Benelux Union.
Resources
The Luxembourgish Presidency was relatively well-resourced in the context of the
eurozone crisis. The budget for the Presidency in 2015 was €71 million (Ministère des
Affaires étrangères, 2015). From a Luxembourgish perspective, these allocations were
not overly generous. The guideline had been to keep the budget within the same margins
as the budget of the presidency of 2005 plus inﬂation.10 Even though Luxembourg
weathered the eurozone crisis comparatively well and could largely avoid painful budget-
ary cuts, approaches to public spending had become more cautious. On the other hand, the
workload had become lighter now that the Foreign Affairs Council and the European
5 Interview with two ofﬁcials of the Ministère des ﬁnances, Luxembourg, 31 March 2016.
6 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 25 February 2016.
7 On the Italian presidency see Carbone (2015); on the Latvian presidency see Auers and Rostoks in this volume.
8 Interview with two ofﬁcials of the Ministère des ﬁnances, Luxembourg, 31 March 2016.
9 Interview with a Council ofﬁcial for Transport, Telecommunications, Energy, Brussels, 15 February 2016.
10 Interview with two ofﬁcials, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 21 March 2016.
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Council are no longer chaired by the rotating presidency.11 On the whole the budget was
relatively generous compared to that of other countries for which data are available:
Lithuania’s budget was around €62 million in 2013, Ireland’s around €45 million in
2013 (half of what was spent during its presidency in 2004) and Spain’s around €55
million in 2010 (Heywood, 2011; Laffan, 2014; Vilpišauskas, 2014). Only Poland
adopted a generous budget of around €100 million (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2012).
Style
As in the past, the Luxembourgish Presidency was organized as a Brussels-based presi-
dency. The Permanent Representation in Brussels had enough leeway to run the negotia-
tions relatively independently, as it was felt that this approach facilitates fast and effective
negotiations. In addition, the heads of the permanent representation and of COREPER I
and II and many Luxembourgish ofﬁcials beneﬁtted from the experience of previous
presidencies. The Permanent Representation was helped by a generous allocation of
temporary support staff and delegated civil servants (189 temporary support staff were
hired in total), and the staff working on migration was further increased during the pres-
idency when it became clear that the dossier would be more prominent than expected.12
The presidency was seen to be European and consensual in its approach. Luxembourg
had no big national agenda and was praised for allowing the ‘natural compromise’ to
emerge (for example, in the case of the fourth railway package).13 In this context, it is
also interesting to note that the presidency did not regard the fact that Commission Pres-
ident Jean-Claude Juncker had been Prime Minister of Luxembourg from 1995–2013 as
particularly important. The consensus among interviewees is that Juncker acted in line
with the premise that Commissioners are not supposed to feel attached to a particular
Member State and that his long experience as Luxembourgish Prime Minister only
mattered in so far as it facilitated communication with the presidency.
In general, the presidency was perceived to be pragmatic and focused on compromise-
building in line with the national culture of compromise (see also Hearl, 2006). In part this
is also due to the fact that smaller states tend to be more aware of their relative weight in
the Council, although there is a marked difference between the Belgian or Luxembourgish
approach and the Latvian approach, which saw the presidency as an opportunity for a
small state to have inﬂuence.14 Part of this pragmatism was also the adoption of a concise
list or priorities (see below) that reﬂected the shift of competences to the High Represen-
tative and the Permanent President of the European Council. It was felt that Luxembourg
could afford to be pragmatic, given its good reputation and long and positive
track-records with presidencies.15
Finally, the presidency beneﬁtted from the multilingualism of Luxembourgish
ofﬁcials, who generally speak French, German and English. In addition, they rotate less
often than ofﬁcials in other Member States and thus beneﬁt from longer-term expertise
in their area. The smaller size of the administration means that people know each other
11 Interview with two ofﬁcials, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 21 March 2016.
12 Interview with a member of the Luxembourgish Permanent Representation in Brussels, 24 February 2016. Interview with
an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 25 February 2016.
13 Interview with a Council ofﬁcial for Transport, Telecommunications, Energy, Brussels, 15 February 2016.
14 Interview with a Council ofﬁcial for Transport, Telecommunications, Energy, Brussels, 15 February 2016.
15 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 25 February 2016.
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better and that trust is easier to establish (Hearl, 2006). Moreover, they have also a more
horizontal view of policies as the small size of the administration means that people often
work on several dossiers.16
II. Priorities and Progress
The preparations of the presidency in terms of content were delayed until late 2014 by the
election of the European Parliament in 2014 and the subsequent nomination of a new
European Commission. These political developments meant that the views of several
important European institutions were changing, which inﬂuenced in turn what goals the
Council Presidency could realistically achieve.17 In the end, the priorities took into
account the stated priorities of the European Council (2014), the policy orientations of
the Juncker Commission, the annual work programme of the Commission and – to a
lesser extent – the work programme of the Trio (Luxembourgish Presidency, 2015a).
In line with the pragmatic style of the presidency, the priorities were summarized in a
relatively short document of 33 pages, the shortest in the last six presidencies. The aim
was to have a realistic and feasible programme. A common thread was concerns with a
more competitive but also a more social Europe as well as with a shift to a more modern,
green economy (Luxembourgish Presidency, 2015a).
Stimulating Investment to Boost Growth and Employment
In the context of the eurozone crisis, high unemployment and low growth was one of the
key priorities of the presidency. An important element was the support for the Investment
Plan for Europe by reducing barriers to investment and improving regulation.18 In addi-
tion, the presidency achieved progress in several dossiers related to capital markets union,
for example, by reaching political agreement on a proposal to relaunch the simple, trans-
parent and standardized securitisation in just nine weeks (Renman and Russack, 2016).19
Another important achievement was the introduction of a new working method in the
Competitiveness Council: the ‘competitiveness check-up’. Under this new procedure, the
beginning of Competitiveness Council meetings will be dedicated to an assessment of com-
petitiveness based on certain indicators. In addition, the Competitiveness Council should
broaden its debates by also considering issues that fall into the domain of other formations
(for example, social affairs, environment or transport), but that could have an impact on
competitiveness (Competitiveness Council, 2015; Luxembourgish Presidency, 2015b).
Finally, a major success of the Luxembourgish presidency were the negotiations of the
EU’s annual budget where the presidency managed to reach a unanimous agreement
within the timeframe. This was the ﬁrst time since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis in
2008 that the Council agreed unanimously on the budget.20
16 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 25 February 2016.
17 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 25 February 2016.
18 Interview with two ofﬁcials of the Ministère des ﬁnances, Luxembourg, 31 March 2016.
19 See Quaglia et al’s contribution to this volume.
20 See Quaglia et al’s contribution to this volume.
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Deepening the European Union’s Social Dimension
The presidency aimed to encourage progress towards a Europe with a ‘Triple A social
rating’ by boosting social investment. In this context, one non-legislative goal was to
encourage (or even force) debate on the social dimension of the eurozone. This aim
was difﬁcult and even controversial, as the eurozone crisis had brought different
approaches to the social dimension to the fore. In addition to discussions in the employ-
ment, social policy, health and consumer affairs (EPSCO) council, the presidency held a
tripartite social summit in October 2015. It also organized the ﬁrst ever informal Council
of the Ministers for Employment and Social Affairs of the eurozone countries to discuss
the social dimension of EMU. In this case, the government went against its culture of con-
sensus and deliberately organized the meeting knowing that it would be contentious.21
While several council decisions and conclusions were adopted during the presidency,
for example the decision on guidelines for employment policies in the Member States,
it is questionable whether EU policies became noticeably more social in substance.
Managing Migration, Combining Freedom, Security and Justice
Luxembourg was ﬁrmly committed to a European solution to the migration crisis and to an
approach that respects established European values and the rule of law. The presidency
managed to broker a number of difﬁcult agreements, such as the conclusions of the Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) Council on the relocation of 160,000 people and the resettlement
of 22,504 people in July and September 2015. In addition, the Council agreed in October to
earmark almost half a billion euro of additional funding for the management of the migra-
tion crisis in the EU budget, allowing for the creation of 120 new positions in the relevant
EU agencies. The Council also adopted conclusions on a new returns and readmission
policy and prepared the ground for the EU–Turkey agreement on refugees during a summit
in November. At the same time, the migration crisis actually illustrated both views on the
impact of external crises on presidencies (Vandecasteele and Bossuyt, 2014). On the one
hand, it offered the presidency the opportunity to play a stronger agenda-shaping role than
in ‘ordinary’ legislative business. At the same time, the intensity of disagreement among
Member States made it extremely difﬁcult to reach decisions (Luxembourgish Presidency,
2015c). Despite the extensive efforts of Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn, it was not
possible to reach consensus. The decision of the Council on quotas was thus the ﬁrst
decision in this policy area to be taken by qualiﬁed majority vote rather than unanimity
since the Treaty of Lisbon.22 It was a radical decision, but the presidency felt that consen-
sus was out of reach. The fact that several Member States that ‘lost’ the vote brought a case
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) further illustrates the intensity of the debate.23
The corresponding foot-dragging at the implementation stage reduced the effectiveness of
the policy.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris concerns about security increased. The
presidency held an extraordinary JHA Council meeting to discuss the coordination of
responses to terrorism and improved cooperation between Member States.24 The
21 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 25 February 2016.
22 BBC News, 22 September 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34329825.
23 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 19 April 2016.
24 On developments in the ﬁeld of Justice and Home Affairs see Monar’s contribution to this volume.
Anna-Lena Högenauer6
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
presidency managed to broker a compromise between Member States and between the
Council and the Parliament on the European passenger name record, a dossier that had
been blocked for years with disagreements on data protection.25 Similarly, the presidency
reached an informal agreement with the European Parliament in trialogue on the Data
Protection Package (Renman and Russack, 2016).
Revitalising the Single Market by Focusing on its Digital Dimension
An important success in this dimension was the advancing of the two most sensitive
elements in the fourth railway package.26 The aim of the Commission was to liberalize
passenger transport service and to strengthen railway infrastructure governance by
separating railway and infrastructure companies. The ﬁnal compromise in the Council
was a more functional separation rather than a clear division of the two types of compa-
nies. In addition, countries can still directly allocate the contract to a company subject to
certain conditions. This compromise is seen to be the ‘logical compromise’, but also a
fragile compromise as positions on liberalization diverge.27 Similarly, in the case of
the Council Conclusions on Energy Governance, thorough preparation allowed the
presidency to broker an agreement on a completely new ﬁle in a very short time. It was
an important dossier for Luxembourg as the administrative burden of reporting on differ-
ent aspects of energy at different intervals is particularly difﬁcult to manage for small
Member States (Council, 2015).28
The successful climate talks at the 21st Conference of Parties at the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris were another important
milestone although France and the Commission also played a major part in their negoti-
ation. In this case, the Luxembourgish presidency played a role in the coordination of a
common position within the European Union whereas France and the Commission then
took the lead in the actual COP21 negotiations.
Placing European Competitiveness in a Global and Transparent Framework
This important pillar included both discussion about the future direction of EMU, and
various tax-related policies. As the latter concerned mainly the prevention of tax evasion
within Europe and in a global context, this was a salient dossier for Luxembourg, which
had come to be seen as a tax haven for multi-national corporations following the Luxleaks
affair.29
The presidency nevertheless made important progress. It rapidly reached a political
agreement on the directive on cross-border tax ruling. In addition, the presidency ﬁnalized
work on the OECD Base Erosion and Proﬁt Shifting Initiative (Luxembourgish
Presidency, 2016).
25 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 19 April 2016.
26 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/packages/2013_en.htm
27 Interview with a Council ofﬁcial for Transport, Telecommunications, Energy, Brussels, 15 February 2016.
28 Interview with a member of the Luxembourgish Permanent Representation in Brussels, 24 February 2016. Interview with
a Council ofﬁcial for Transport, Telecommunications, Energy, Brussels, 15 February 2016.
29 Deutschlandfunk, 24 July 2015, http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/luxemburg-vor-dem-eu-ratsvorsitz-griechenland-und-
andere.724.de.html?dram:article_id=324007.
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The presidency was also marked by progress on trade agreements. In the case of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the US, the Luxembourgish presi-
dency promoted demands by civil society to create reading rooms to give national parlia-
mentarians access to the relevant documents.
Promoting Sustainable Development
This pillar, which overlaps with the fourth pillar, was salient as it gained global attention
in two major conferences, the Special Summit on Sustainable Development in New York
in September 2015 and COP21 in Paris in December 2015 (see above).
Internally, the reform of the emissions trading scheme (ETS) was a key issue. The
market stability reserve was adopted in September as a ﬁrst step towards the reform of
the ETS. In addition, the ﬁrst policy debate on the reform of the ETS was held during
the environment council in October.
The presidency also tackled various questions of sustainability in the context of
agricultural and ﬁsheries policy. It was able to broker an agreement on the 2016 ﬁshing
quotas for certain ﬁsh stocks in December with a view to integrating sustainability into
this policy area.
Strengthening the European Union’s Presence on the Global Stage
This was the least ambitious pillar of the presidency’s programme as it was deemed to fall
largely under the remit of the High Representative of the European Union and the
European External Action Service. However, the presidency organized the 12th Asia–
European foreign ministers’ meeting, which brought together 53 delegations. It also
encouraged an active enlargement policy and was pleased that a particularly high number
of chapters were opened during accession negotiations.30 New chapters were opened for
negotiation with Turkey and Montenegro and accession negotiations with Serbia began.
Perceptions of the Presidency
On the whole, despite the crises that affected the European Union, the Luxembourgish
presidency itself was generally seen positively by politicians and the media.31 The ple-
nary debate in the European Parliament on the ‘bilan de la présidence’ was overwhelm-
ingly positive. Criticism came mostly from the extreme right on migration, from the
left on the need for even more social measures and there was still some criticism on
Luxembourg’s past policy on corporate taxation (European Parliament, 2016).
The presidency did well on its legislative programme, concluding 34 legislative ﬁles
under the ordinary legislative procedure (Luxembourgish Presidency, 2016). This number
is low compared to other presidencies, but it is the result of a deliberate reduction in new
legislation on the part of the European Commission under Barroso and Juncker.32 The
Luxembourgish presidency also managed to negotiate a new interinstitutional agreement
to facilitate better law-making in the European Union (Renman and Russack, 2016).
30 Interview with an ofﬁcial of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Luxembourg, 19 April 2016.
31 France Inter, 1 January 2016; Le Quotidien, 19 December 2015.
32 Interview with a Council ofﬁcial for Transport, Telecommunications, Energy, Brussels, 15 February 2016.
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Conclusion
Overall, despite the context of crisis, the presidency successfully concluded or advanced a
range of important dossiers – at times quite rapidly. Part of the explanation is that the
presidency had adopted a realistic programme to begin with. In addition, the presidency
managed to create many of the conditions for success outlined by Vandecasteele and
Bossuyt (2014). As far as national conditions are concerned, it beneﬁted from a high level
of experience and a culture of consensus, but also from a climate of trust between differ-
ent Luxembourgish actors. This allowed it to become a truly Brussels-based presidency
that focused on being an honest broker. Also, while it could only ﬁx its priorities compar-
atively late, it was well prepared on its priorities. At the same time, unexpected shifts in
the agenda or the nature of policy problems, such as the sudden prominence of the eastern
route for refugees, clearly made it difﬁcult for all actors to forge compromises.
In terms of crises, the presidency was to some extent shielded by the provisions of the
Lisbon Treaty. Both the migration crisis and the terrorist attacks in Paris, however, left
their mark on the presidency. The early decisions in the migration crisis, in particular,
were an achievement, but also controversial. This example also illustrates the importance
of being able to take decisions with qualiﬁed majority voting. At the same time, it is now
obvious that Member States are reluctant to accept being outvoted in a policy area that
touches what is perceived to be fundamental national interests.
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